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ABSTRACT 
The nature of offshore oil and gas activities is changing as companies are 
forced into difficult and remote areas, including the U.S. Arctic Ocean. As 
evidenced by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon tragedy and Shell’s error-plagued 
efforts to drill exploration wells in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas in 2012, the 
rules governing whether and under what conditions to allow offshore drilling 
in frontier areas have not kept pace with environmental and technical 
changes. These rules were implemented in 1979 and have remained 
substantively the same since. Recent changes to at the Department of the 
Interior to disband the Minerals Management Service, improve certain safety 
requirements, and move toward implementing Arctic-specific spill prevention 
and response requirements are important steps. Those changes, however, 
apply only after the decision to allow oil and gas activity has been made. 
Congress has not amended the governing statute, and the agency has not 
modified in any meaningful way the regulations that govern the initial 
processes through which it decides whether and under what circumstances to 
allow offshore oil and gas activities in a given area. This Article argues that 
the regulations that govern offshore oil and gas planning and leasing should 
be fundamentally revised to account for changes in the industry and agency, 
remedy broadly acknowledged deficiencies, and reflect new administrative 
policies. It also recommends a path to achieve the needed change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“The deterioration of the environment is in large measure the result of our 
inability to keep pace with progress. We have become victims of our own 
technological genius.”1 
 
The nature of offshore oil and gas activities is changing. More and 
more, companies are forced into difficult and remote areas, including 
the U.S. Arctic Ocean and ultra-deepwater. At the same time, Arctic 
waters are growing warmer, sea ice is declining rapidly, and the ocean is 
becoming more acidic.2 Increasing attention from the scientific 
community, politicians, and the public at large has been focused on 
government choices about how to balance the desire for affordable 
energy with the need to maintain healthy, functioning ocean ecosystems 
in the Arctic. As evidenced by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon tragedy and 
Shell’s error-plagued efforts to drill exploration wells in the Chukchi 
and Beaufort seas in 2012,3 the rules governing whether and under what 
conditions to allow offshore drilling in frontier areas have not kept pace 
with environmental and technical changes. 
After the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound and 
the 1969 Santa Barbara blowout, Congress enacted legislation designed 
to enhance safety, improve government decision-making, and prevent 
future marine oil disasters.4 To date, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and 
the problems experienced by Shell in the Arctic have not spurred similar 
congressional action. Though Congress has not addressed deficiencies in 
the law, the Department of the Interior (DOI) has taken some steps to 
address obvious problems. Most notably, it disbanded the Minerals 
Management Service and replaced it with three independent successor 
agencies, improved certain safety requirements, and moved toward 
implementing Arctic-specific spill prevention and response 
requirements.5 
 
 1.  1969 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RICHARD 
NIXON 222 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971). 
 2.  Arctic Sea Ice Decline, WEATHER UNDERGROUND, 
http://www.wunderground.com/climate/SeaIce.asp (last viewed Oct. 3, 2014); 
Assessment of Arctic Ocean Acidification Studies Seawater pH, ARCTIC COUNCIL (July 
2013), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/resources/ news-and-
press/news-archive/762-assessment-of-arctic-ocean-acidification-studies-
seawater-ph. 
 3.  See infra Part II.B. 
 4.  See infra Part III.A. 
 5.  See HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41485, REORGANIZATION OF 
THE MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE DEEPWATER 
HORIZON OIL SPILL 2 (2010). As explained below, at least some of the problems 
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While necessary and laudable, the substantive changes undertaken 
by DOI apply only after the decision to allow oil and gas activity has 
been made. DOI has not modified in any meaningful way the planning 
and leasing regulations that govern the initial processes through which 
the agency decides whether and under what circumstances to allow 
offshore oil and gas activities in a given area. These rules have remained 
essentially unchanged from their initial promulgation more than three 
decades ago. They have not kept pace with changes in the industry, and 
they fail to provide effective guidance, reflect new agency culture, 
incorporate updated analytical methodologies, or conform to modern 
policy priorities. 
Existing law gives DOI ample flexibility to make meaningful 
changes to these outdated planning and leasing regulations. Regulatory 
reform could yield a more transparent and inclusive framework to guide 
decision-making about offshore oil and gas activities. Improved 
regulations could further good governance by providing for an 
appropriate balance of costs and benefits, the means to effectively 
identify and mitigate risks, a measure of consistency and certainty for 
corporate stakeholders, and meaningful protections for sensitive areas. 
These benefits could yield substantial improvements in agency decision-
making processes and outcomes in the Arctic Ocean. 
This Article argues in favor of revising the regulations that govern 
offshore oil and gas planning and leasing and recommends a path to 
achieve the needed change. While this Article focuses on application of 
these regulations to oil and gas activities in the frontier areas—the Arctic 
Ocean and ultra-deepwater—reform could yield benefits in all federal 
waters. The first Part of this Article briefly summarizes the history of the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, its provisions, and its implementing 
regulations. Part II explains the need for reform, and Part III identifies 
the changes that have—and have not—been implemented to date. Part 
IV addresses DOI’s authority to make the necessary changes. Finally, 
this Article concludes by suggesting one path DOI could follow if it 
chooses to revise its existing regulations. 
I. THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACT AND 
IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS 
Federal offshore oil and gas activities are governed by the Outer 
Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).6 OCSLA calls for the 
 
addressed by these changes were apparent before the Deepwater Horizon tragedy 
and Shell’s 2012 season. See infra Part II.B. 
 6.  Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–
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“expeditious and orderly development” of offshore oil and gas 
resources, “subject to environmental safeguards.”7 The Parts that follow 
give a brief history of OCSLA, summarize the framework established by 
the statute, and describe the relevant implementing regulations. 
A. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
Congress enacted OCSLA in 1953.8 While the original statute 
authorized development of oil and gas resources on the Outer 
Continental Shelf (OCS), it did not establish a systematic approach to 
management; it failed to address oil pollution liability, state and local 
government involvement, injury to other users of the OCS, 
environmental concerns, and long-term energy policy.9 
In 1978, Congress sought to remedy some of these weaknesses 
through comprehensive amendments to the statute.10 Those 
amendments were designed to improve lease administration, promote 
greater involvement of states and localities, and enhance safety and 
environmental protection.11 The 1978 amendments required oil and gas 
leasing programs intended to encourage more balanced development, 
less environmental damage, and fewer impacts on coastal zones.12 The 
amendments also created an oil and gas information program within the 
United States Geological Survey, established an offshore oil spill 
pollution fund, provided grants to coastal states, and established 
contingency funds for fishermen.13 In short, Congress intended the 1978 
amendments to create a “new statutory regime” that would rein in 
agency discretion and address the environmental shortcomings of the 
 
1356b (2012). 
 7.  § 1332(3) (2012). 
 8.  Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462 
(1953) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1356b (2012). 
 9.  H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, at 53 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 
1460–61. 
 10.  Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–
372, 92 Stat. 629. The only amendment to OCSLA prior to 1978 concerned the 
application of state law to OCS activities. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1524 (2012); 43 
U.S.C. § 1333 (2012). Section 19(f) of the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 made 
existing state law applicable to OCS activities, rather than state laws in force at 
the time of OCSLA’s original enactment. Pub. L. No. 93-627, § 19(f), 88 Stat. 2126, 
2146. 
 11.  H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, supra note 9, at 55; see Robert B. Krueger & Louis 
H. Singer, An Analysis of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 
19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 909, 911–22 (1979) (providing a more detailed overview of 
changes made by the 1978 amendments to OCSLA). 
 12.  43 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012). Current regulation of five-year leasing programs 
occurs under 30 C.F.R. §§ 556.16–556.28. 
 13.  H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, supra note 9, at 55. 
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original statute.14 
While Congress has amended OCSLA since 1978, it has not 
fundamentally altered the management scheme.15 Today, the framework 
for government decisions about OCS oil and gas activities is well-
established under the law. 
B. OCSLA Framework 
OCSLA establishes a four-stage process for offshore oil and gas 
planning, exploration, and development.16 First, the Secretary of the 
Interior develops a nationwide leasing program, which establishes a 
five-year schedule of proposed lease sales.17 The plan must indicate, “as 
precisely as possible, the size, timing, and location of leasing activity 
which . . . will best meet national energy needs” and “obtain a proper 
balance between the potential for environmental damage, the potential 
for the discovery of oil and gas, and the potential for adverse impact on 
the coastal zone.”18 
Second, DOI holds the lease sales scheduled in the five-year leasing 
program. OCSLA calls for DOI to auction lease tracts in a competitive 
bidding process; successful companies obtain a conditional right “to 
explore, develop, and produce the oil and gas contained within the lease 
area.”19 
Third, companies submit, and the government evaluates, plans to 
drill exploration wells on purchased leases.20 In addition to exploration 
drilling, companies may apply to conduct seismic testing and other 
 
 14.  Id. at 53–55 (“The increased importance of OCS resources, the increased 
consideration of environmental and onshore impacts, and emphasis on 
comprehensive land use planning require that Congress detail standards and 
criteria for the Secretary to follow in the exercise of his authority.”). 
 15.  Most recently, OCSLA was amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, 
which granted the Department of the Interior (DOI) jurisdiction for OCS 
renewable energy projects. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594. 
 16.  See Andrew Hartsig, Shortcomings and Solutions: Reforming the Outer 
Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Framework in the Wake of the Deepwater Horizon 
Disaster, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 269, 273 (2011); LeVine, et al., Oil and Gas in 
America’s Arctic Ocean: Past Pr’oblems Counsel Precaution, 38 SEATTLE U.L. REV 
(forthcoming 2015). 
 17.  43 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2012). 
 18.  § 1344(a)(3), (1). As a result of litigation in the early 1980s, these plans 
are prepared in years ending in 2 and 7. See LeVine, et al. supra note 16. The 
current plan, for example, encompasses 2012–17, BOEM, PROPOSED FINAL OUTER 
CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM (2012), and BOEM will prepare 
the 2017-2022 program next. 
 19.  § 1337(b)(4). 
 20.  § 1340(c)(1) 
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activities on their lease tracts.21 Such activities are subject to approvals 
separate from the exploration plan process. 
Fourth, if companies find resources warranting production, they 
may submit proposals for development. Operators’ activities must 
conform with approved development and production plans.22 
In addition to adhering to the mandates established by OCSLA, 
government agencies involved in offshore oil and gas activities must 
satisfy the requirements of a variety of other statutes including the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Clean Water Act, Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990, Endangered Species Act, and Marine Mammal 
Protection Act. While NEPA applies at all four stages of the process, the 
requirements of the other statutes are not triggered by the preparation of 
a five-year leasing program.23 
C. Implementing Regulations 
Although OCSLA provides a process for decisions about offshore 
oil and gas activities, the framework is relatively broad and gives DOI 
substantial flexibility to determine exactly how and where oil and gas 
activities should be planned and permitted on the OCS.24 Regulations 
implementing this framework should provide regulators, oil and gas 
companies, and the general public with the information and 
mechanisms needed to implement the statute in a manner consistent 
with Congress’s objectives. In practice, however, DOI’s regulations often 
fall short of the mark. 
Although federal agencies can and should address other issues 
related to the implementation of OCSLA and the other statutes noted 
above, this Article focuses primarily on DOI regulations governing the 
first two phases of the OCSLA process: development of a five-year 
 
 21.  See NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., EFFECTS OF OIL AND GAS 
ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC OCEAN: SUPPLEMENTAL DRAFT ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT 
ES-1 to ES-4 (2013). 
 22.  43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1). 
 23.  See Hartsig, supra note 16, at 273–74. Prior to 2010, companies seeking to 
operate in the Arctic were subject to EPA regulations implementing the Clear 
Air Act. See 42 U.S.C. 7627(a), (b) (2010). A legislative rider attached to the 2011 
Omnibus Appropriations Act transferred the authority to regulate air emissions 
from offshore activities in OCS area adjacent to the North Slope Borough of 
Alaska back to the Department of the Interior.. See Consolidated Appropriations 
Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 432, 125 Stat. 785, 1048–49. Similarly, prior to 
2011, Alaska’s Coastal Management Program applied to oil and gas activities in 
federal waters. That program was allowed to expire in 2011. Tim Bradner, State’s 
Coastal Zone Management Authority to Expire This Month, ALASKA J. OF COMMERCE 
(June 3, 2011), http://classic.alaskajournal.com/stories/060311/loc_sczm.shtml. 
 24.  See infra Part III.A. 
ARCTICLE - LEVINE ET AL. (DO NOT DELETE) 12/29/2014 6:10 PM 
2014 WHAT ABOUT BOEM? 237 
program and leasing under that program. 
When originally passed by Congress in 1953, OCSLA gave DOI 
authority to lease OCS lands for oil and gas production.25 DOI 
promulgated the first regulations under this authority in 1954.26 In the 
following years, DOI updated these regulations as the agency refined its 
procedures and OCS activities expanded.27 Although DOI made 
substantive changes to its OCS leasing regulations between 1954 and 
1978, the scope of these early regulations was ultimately limited by the 
scope of the original statute. 
The 1978 amendments to OCSLA mark the transition to the 
framework in place today. Not surprisingly, those amendments 
triggered a major overhaul of DOI’s OCS regulations in 1979.28 
In the 35 years since, changes have been made to the regulations 
governing revenue, safety, and operations.29 The planning and leasing 
regulations, however, have remained largely unchanged since their 
implementation in 1979.30 Between 1980 and 2011, DOI made a total of 
twenty-five amendments to these planning and leasing regulations.31 Of 
those, only eight were substantive; the remaining seventeen 
implemented technical corrections, re-designations, and definitional 
updates.  
Of the eight substantive changes, only two were significant. In both 
cases, the changes were largely directed at operations on leases once 
they have been purchased.32 In 1999, DOI amended its regulations to 
 
 25.  Section 5 of the original OCSLA of 1953 provides for administration of 
leasing, Section 6 for maintenance of leases, and Section 8 for leasing procedures. 
Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462, 464–65 (1953). 
 26.  Oil and Gas Leasing in Lands Under Rights-of-Way, 19 Fed. Reg. 9041 
(Dec. 23, 1954) (codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 221). 
 27.  For example, in 1975, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) amended 
its leasing regulations to establish joint bidding procedures and restrict the 
ability of major oil companies to bid together and to allow alien permanent 
residents to bid on and hold OCS leases. 43 C.F.R. § 3300.1, 3302.3-3 (1975). BLM 
also revised its regulations to require oil and gas companies to provide certain 
exploration data to the U.S. Geological Survey. 30 C.F.R. §§ 251.12, 252.3 43 
C.F.R. § 3302.3-3 (1978). 
 28.  See Outer Continental Shelf Minerals Leasing and Rights-of-Way 
Granting Programs, 44 Fed. Reg. 38,268 (June 29, 1979 (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 
2880). Changes in regulations governing production operations, however, are 
beyond the scope of this article. 
 29.  See infra Part III.B. 
 30.  These regulations are currently codified at 30 C.F.R. §§ 556.16–556.28 
(2012) (five-year planning) and §§ 556.29–556.80 (leasing). 
 31.  See infra Table A (summarizing the history of 30 C.F.R. pt. 556 from 
implementation to present). 
 32.  See, e.g., Postlease Operations Safety, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,756 (Dec. 28, 1999) 
(codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250) (updating and clarifying requirements related to 
post-lease operations and setting out operator disqualification criteria, among 
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clarify post-lease operating and diligence requirements.33 Among other 
things, the amendments allowed for disqualification of operators with 
repeated poor performance.34 The second major change came in 2002, 
when DOI updated decommissioning requirements to improve their 
clarity and bring the regulations in line with current technologies.35 The 
remaining six substantive amendments to the planning and leasing 
regulations had only minor impact: three changes to surety bond 
provisions, an alteration of lease terms based on water depth, and two 
changes to the royalty program.36 None of these changes affected the 
regulations that govern DOI’s choices about whether and under what 
conditions to allow offshore oil and gas leasing; the regulations 
governing those decisions remain more or less the same as they were 
thirty-five years ago. 
In addition to being outdated, DOI’s planning and leasing 
regulations are functionally deficient. The regulations governing the 
five-year planning process, for example, provide no substantive 
direction for agency staff or decision-makers to employ as they try to 
meet the statutory directive to “select the timing and location of leasing, 
to the maximum extent practicable, so as to obtain a proper balance 
between the potential for environmental damage, the potential for the 
discovery of oil and gas, and the potential for adverse impact on the 
coastal zone.”37 Nor can they be read to include any useful standards, 
 
other requirements); Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer 
Continental Shelf—Decommissioning Activities, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,398 (May 17, 
2002) (codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 250, 256) (updating decommissioning 
requirements for oil and gas operations in the OCS). 
 33.  Postlease Operations Safety, 64 Fed. Reg. at 72,756. 
 34.  Although this provision has been in the regulations for the past fifteen 
years, the Bureau of Ocean Management (BOEM) and Bureau of Safety 
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) have never disqualified an operator on the 
basis of performance. Instead the agencies and their predecessor, the Minerals 
Management Service, have relied on Performance Improvement Plans to change 
operator behavior. On BSEE’s website only two operators are listed as 
participating in Performance Improvement Plans: TALOS Energy LLC is listed 
as currently participating, and Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations, LLC is 
listed as previously participating. Performance Improvement Plans, BUREAU OF 
SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT, http://www.bsee.gov/Inspection-
and-Enforcement/Enforcement-Programs/Performance_improvement_Plans 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
 35.  Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Outer Continental Shelf—
Decommissioning Activities, 67 Fed. Reg. at 35,398 (“[This rule] restructured the 
requirements to make the regulations easier to read and understand . . . [and] 
updated requirements to reflect changes in technology.”). 
 36. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 45,255; 61 Fed. Reg. 55,887; 62 Fed. Reg. 36,995; 66 Fed. 
Reg. 11,512; 66 Fed. Reg. 60,147; 73 FR 52,917. See Table A for a summary of 
these changes. 
 37.  43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3); id. § 1344(a)(1). BOEM has stated that “[s]triking 
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guidelines, or benchmarks to guide consideration of the nine factors that 
the statute requires the agency to consider in allocating the “[t]iming 
and location of exploration, development, and production” among the 
various ocean regions.38 Instead, the existing regulations cover only: 
nominations for inclusion of areas in the plan; public notice, including 
review by state and local governments; consultation; consistency with 
state coastal zone management programs; reports from federal agencies; 
and requirements for area identification and lease tract size.39 The closest 
the regulations come to providing guidance on the balancing required in 
crafting the leasing program are the directions to the agency to 
“evaluate fully the potential effect of leasing on the human, marine and 
coastal environments, and develop measures to mitigate adverse 
impacts, including lease stipulations.”40 
The regulations governing lease sales are similarly devoid of 
substantive direction with regard, for example, to determining whether 
to hold a scheduled sale and what portions of the OCS program area 
should be included in that sale. In fact, the only explicit requirement 
regarding the ocean environment is the direction to “develop measures, 
including lease stipulations and conditions, to mitigate adverse impacts 
on the environments.”41 All of the remaining regulations describe 
opportunities for comment, bidding requirements and systems, 
bonding, or other procedural requirements.42 
 
this balance based on a consideration of the principles and factors enumerated in 
section 18(a) is a matter of judgment for which no ready formula exists. Section 
18 requires the consideration of a broad range of principles and factors rather 
than imposing an inflexible formula for making decisions.” BOEM, PROPOSED 
FINAL OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM 188 (2012). 
Without regulatory guidance to help it undertake that balancing, the agency in 
2012 was left to quote extensively from the D.C. Circuit opinions evaluating 
challenges to its earlier efforts. Id. at 191–93. 
 38.  43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2). For example, OCSLA Section 18(a)(2)(B) requires 
consideration of “an equitable sharing of developmental benefits and 
environmental risks among the various regions.” Id. § 1344(a)(2)(B). BOEM 
meets this obligation using a net benefits calculation. See BOEM, PROPOSED FINAL 
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM 134 (2012). There are no 
regulations to guide this analysis, the factors considered, or reliance on the 
conclusions reached. 
 39.  30 C.F.R. §§ 556.16–556.28 (2011). 
 40.  Id. § 556.26(b). 
 41.  Id. § 556.29(a). 
 42.  Id. §§ 556.29–.80. Separate regulations govern lease cancellation and 
suspension. See §§ 550.181–.185. 
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II. THERE IS CLEAR NEED TO REFORM THE AGENCY’S PLANNING 
AND LEASING REGULATIONS 
DOI’s regulations have not kept pace with changes in the oil and 
gas industry since the late 1970s. The following Subparts describe the 
rapid pace of change, calls for regulatory change, and the new priorities 
that are not reflected in existing regulations. 
A. Rapid Change and Growing Challenges in the Oil and Gas 
Industry 
The nature of the offshore oil and gas industry has changed 
substantially since DOI promulgated its planning and leasing 
regulations in the late 1970s. Most notably, exploration and production 
have been forced to deeper and more remote waters. These places in the 
ocean—ultra-deepwater and the Arctic Ocean—are often referred to as 
“frontier areas,” and it is widely recognized that good management of 
the resources in these frontier areas requires particular care.43 
In the Gulf of Mexico, offshore exploration and development began 
in shallower waters on the continental shelf. In the 1980s, however, 
economic and geologic factors pushed the industry to explore “larger 
fields in deeper waters.”44 Discoveries in deeper water led to producing 
wells in the 1990s, and by the end of that decade, deepwater production 
surpassed production from shallow waters.45 Shortly thereafter, 
deepwater wells were producing twice as much oil as shallow water 
wells, and a growing amount of that oil came from “ultra-deepwater” 
wells more than 5,000 feet below the ocean surface.46 At the same time, 
“[d]rilling contractors developed a new generation of vessels that took 
drilling from 5,000 to 10,000 feet of water, and from 20,000 to 30,000 feet 
of sub-seafloor depth.”47 At these extreme depths, operating challenges 
include: extreme pressure and temperature; difficult and poorly 
 
 43.  See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND 
OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 300–01 (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/pdf/GPO-
OILCOMMISSION.pdf. 
 44. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF OFFSHORE OIL DRILLING 7 (2010), available at 
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/oilspill/20121211011815/http://www.o
ilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/A%20Brief%20History%
20of%20Offshore%20Drilling%20Working%20Paper%208%2023%2010.pdf. 
 45.  Id. at 9–10. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 37. 
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understood geology; increased distances from reservoir to drilling unit; 
exposure to ocean currents; the need to use remotely operated vehicles; 
and the presence of methane hydrates.48 Despite these challenges, 
deepwater production is likely to grow in importance.49 
Similarly, the growing interest in exploring for oil and gas in the 
Arctic Ocean has been described as part of a new Arctic “gold rush.”50 
Energy companies spent billions of dollars purchasing leases and 
pursuing exploration in federal waters of the U.S. Arctic Ocean in the 
1980s and early 1990s.51 However, no development resulted, and by 
2000, industry had allowed almost all of those leases to expire.52 A 
decade or so later, changing conditions in the Arctic, high energy prices, 
and rising demand led to renewed interest in the region. Between 2003 
and 2008, energy companies purchased more than 1 million acres of 
leases in the Beaufort Sea and more than 2 million acres in the Chukchi 
Sea.53 Shell sought approvals to drill exploration wells beginning in 
2007,54 but the company has yet to complete any wells.55 
 
 48.  Id. at 51–52. 
 49.  Oversight Hearing on “The Final Report from the President’s National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling Before the H. 
Comm. on Natural Res., 112th Cong. 37 (2011) (joint statement of the Honorable 
Bob Graham, Co-Chairman, National Commission on the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, and the Honorable William K. Reilly, 
Co-Chairman, National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
Offshore Drilling) [hereinafter Graham & Reilly Testimony]; see also NAT’L 
COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, A 
BRIEF HISTORY OF OFFSHORE OIL DRILLING, supra note 44, at 15 (“[M]ost experts 
project the world’s appetite for oil and other fuels to grow for the foreseeable 
future. The role of deepwater oil and gas in providing that energy is also likely 
to grow.”). 
 50.  See, e.g., Isaac Arnsdorf, Diamonds to Oil Bring Gold Rush Dreams to 
Melting Arctic, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-29/diamonds-to-oil-bring-gold-
rush-dreams-to-melting-arctic.html. 
 51.  See LeVine, et al. supra note 16 (forthcoming 2015). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., HISTORICAL LEASE SALE SUMMARY 
TABLE, (May 13, 2014), available at http://www.boem.gov/ 
uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions/Alaska_Region/Leasing
_and_Plans/Leasing/Historical_Alaska_Region_Lease_Sales.pdf. 
 54.  MINERALS MGMT. SERV., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: SHELL OFFSHORE 
INC. BEAUFORT SEA EXPLORATION PLAN 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/About_BOEM/BOEM_Regions
/Alaska_Region/Environment/Environmental_Analysis/2007-009.pdf. 
 55.  See Clifford Krauss, Shell Submits a Plan for New Exploration of Alaskan 
Arctic Oil, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 28, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/29/business/shell-submits-a-plan-for-new-
alaskan-arctic-oil-exploration.html?_r=0 (showing that Shell is continuing its 
pursuit of Arctic drilling but has not yet succeeded). 
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The challenges of operating in the Arctic Ocean are different, but no 
less severe, than those in deepwater environments.56 These challenges 
include “extreme cold, extended seasons of darkness, hurricane-strength 
storms, and pervasive fog,” and the need to protect rich, sensitive, and 
important ecosystems.57 There is very limited infrastructure in the 
region: the nearest Coast Guard station is in Kodiak, Alaska, roughly 
1,000 miles from the likely locations of oil and gas exploration,58 and the 
nearest large deepwater port is in Dutch Harbor.59 There is no proven 
method to respond effectively in icy waters, and traditional response 
methods may be ineffective.60 In addition, the Arctic region is changing 
rapidly as a result of warming climate, and the lack of information about 
the marine ecosystem or those changes makes it difficult to assess or 
mitigate the effects of industrial activities.61 
 
 56.  See LeVine, et al., supra note 16 (forthcoming 2015). 
 57.  Graham & Reilly Testimony, supra note 49, at 38; see also Legislative 
Hearing on H.R. 2231 Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Mineral Res. of the H. 
Comm. on Natural Res., 112th Cong. 2–7 (2013) (statement of Michael LeVine, 
Pacific Senior Counsel, OCEANA). 
 58.  Dan Joling, Critics Say Grounding Shows Arctic Drilling Danger, USA 
TODAY, (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/ 
01/02/arctic-drilling-danger/1805577/. 
 59.  See Deborah Zabarenko, Arctic Oil Spill Would Challenge Coast Guard, 
REUTERS (Jun. 20, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/20/us-arctic-
oil-idUSTRE75J6O620110620 (quoting U.S. Coast Guard Adm. Robert Papp Jr. as 
saying that “[t]here is nothing up there to operate from at present and we’re 
really starting from ground zero”). 
 60.  See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, NOT SO FAST: SOME PROGRESS IN SPILL 
RESPONSE, BUT US STILL ILL-PREPARED FOR ARCTIC OFFSHORE DEVELOPMENT (2009), 
available at http://assets.worldwildlife.org/publications/401/files/original/ 
Not_So_Fast_Some_Progress_in_Spill_Response_but_US_Still_Unprepared_for_
Arctic_Offshore_Development.pdf?1345754373 (showing difficulties with spill 
response in Alaska); PEW ENV’T GRP., OIL SPILL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE IN THE 
U.S. ARCTIC OCEAN: UNEXAMINED RISKS, UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES 73–75 
(2010), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/ 
oceans_north_legacy/page_attachments/Oil-Spill-Prevention.pdf (showing the 
particular risks associated with drilling in the Arctic); Jacob D. Unger, note, 
Regulating the Arctic Gold Rush: Recommended Regulatory Reforms to Protect Alaska’s 
Arctic Environment from Offshore Oil Drilling Pollution, 31 ALASKA L. REV. 280–90 
(2014) (proposing a multi-factor reform to better align corporate incentives and 
to compensate harmed individuals for losses due to oil spills). 
 61.  INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON COORDINATION OF DOMESTIC ENERGY 
DEVELOPMENT AND PERMITTING IN ALASKA, MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE IN A 
RAPIDLY CHANGING ARCTIC 8 (2013), available at http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/ 
Publications/misc_pdf/IAMreport.pdf. 
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B. The Need for Reform Has Been Broadly Recognized in Light of 
the Tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico and Accidents and Near-
Misses in the Arctic 
The risks inherent in operating in frontier areas have been 
underscored by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon tragedy and by the 
substantial problems that Shell encountered in its efforts to drill 
exploration wells in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas in 2012. Those 
problems and their causes have been detailed elsewhere and are not 
repeated here.62 It is instructive, however, to note that both events 
spurred broad calls for reform. 
The need for reform was, at least in part, evident even before the 
Deepwater Horizon tragedy. Before the accident, DOI had initiated two 
studies: one “to examine how to upgrade the safety inspection program 
for offshore rigs,” and the other “to analyze issues associated with 
drilling in the Arctic.”63 In addition, there was substantial evidence that 
close relationships between regulators and industry resulted in criminal 
and unethical behavior as well as problems with oversight of industry 
operations.64 In January 2009, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar 
announced “an ethics reform initiative in response to the problems 
identified at [the Minerals Management Service] and elsewhere in the 
agency.”65 There were also identified problems with the agency’s 
compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 
 
 62.  See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND 
OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43; U.S. COAST GUARD, 
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MULTIPLE 
RELATED MARINE CASUALTIES AND GROUNDING OF THE MODU KULLUK (2014), 
available at http://www.uscg.mil/d17/sectoranchorage/command/ 
KULLUK%20Investigation.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REVIEW OF SHELL’S 
2012 ALASKA OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION PROGRAM (2013). 
 63.  COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, REPORT REGARDING THE MINERALS 
MANAGEMENT SERVICE’S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT POLICIES, 
PRACTICES, AND PROCEDURES AS THEY RELATE TO OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL 
AND GAS EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 2 n.3 (2010), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/20100816-
ceq-mms-ocs-nepa.pdf. 
 64.  See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, 
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT: MMS OIL MARKETING GROUP–LAKEWOOD (2008), available 
at https://web.archive.org/web/20081002100545/http://www.doioig.gov/ 
upload/RIK%20REDACTED%20FINAL4_082008%20with%20transmittal%209_1
0%20date.pdf (describing the scandal in which MMS employees developed close 
personal relationships with industry members). 
 65.  NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 78 (citing Press Release, U.S. 
Department of the Interior, Secretary Salazar Launches Ethics Reform Initiative 
in Meeting with Minerals Management Service). 
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including in Alaska.66 
The 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill triggered much more intense 
scrutiny of existing OCS oil and gas practices, including the creation of a 
Presidential Commission tasked with determining the causes of the 
disaster, improving oil spill response, and “recommend[ing] reforms to 
make offshore energy production safer.”67 According to the co-chairmen 
of the National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon and Offshore 
Drilling: 
The explosion at the Macondo well and the ensuing enormous 
spill—particularly jarring events because of the belief they 
could never happen—force a reexamination of many widely 
held assumptions about how to reconcile the risks and benefits 
of offshore drilling, and a candid reassessment of the nation’s 
policies for the development of a valuable resource. They also 
support a broader reexamination of the nation’s overall energy 
policy.68 
In the wake of the Deepwater Horizon tragedy, many of the reforms 
identified as necessary understandably focused on safety, oversight, and 
accident prevention and response.69 Calls for reform, however, were not 
limited to those areas. Experts also identified the need to reconsider how 
decisions are made about “whether, when, where, and how to engage in 
offshore drilling”70—choices that are made during the planning and 
lease-sale phases of the OCSLA process. There were specific calls for 
DOI to change the manner in which it undertook planning, leasing, and 
environmental review. The National Commission, for example, 
identified the need for “a more comprehensive overhaul of both leasing 
and the regulatory policies and institutions used to oversee offshore 
 
 66.  See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-276, OFFSHORE OIL 
AND GAS DEVELOPMENT: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE WOULD HELP STRENGTHEN THE 
MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICES ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS IN THE 
NORTH ALEUTIAN BASIN (2010). 
 67.  NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at vi. 
 68.  Graham & Reilly Testimony, supra note 49, at 36; see also U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SAFETY OVERSIGHT 
BOARD REPORT TO SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR KEN SALAZAR 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfi
le&PageID=43677 (“The accident and ensuing spill challenged 40 years of 
generally accepted belief that offshore operations could occur safely under 
existing regulation and oversight.”). 
 69.  NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 249–78. 
 70.  Graham & Reilly Testimony, supra note 49, at 36. 
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activities.”71 It determined that management and oversight—on the part 
of both government and industry—had not “kept pace with rapid 
changes in the technology, practices, and risks associated with the 
different geological and ocean environments being explored and 
developed for oil and gas production.”72 
The National Commission concluded that “[f]undamental reform” 
was “needed in both the structure of those in charge of regulatory 
oversight and their internal decision-making process to ensure their 
political autonomy, technical expertise, and their full consideration of 
environmental protection concerns.”73 Similarly, there have been 
repeated calls to reform the NEPA regulations at all stages of the 
OCSLA process.74 The Council on Environmental Quality, for example, 
recommended reforms designed to address shortcomings in the 
application of NEPA to OCS activities.75 
In addition to recommending general reforms that apply to all 
areas of the OCS, the National Commission also identified the specific 
need to reform the OCS leasing process in frontier areas, including the 
Arctic: 
In less well-explored areas, Interior should reduce the size of 
lease sales so their geographic scope allows for a meaningful 
analysis of potential environmental impacts and identification 
of areas of ecological significance. A bidder on tracts in these 
areas and all other areas should be able to demonstrate, in 
addition to financial prequalification and ability to contain a 
maximum-size spill, experience operating in similar 
environments and a record of safe, environmentally 
responsible operation—either in the United States or as verified 
by a peer regulator for another country. The distinction 
between the OCS and less well-explored areas in the Gulf 
should be defined by the new entity in charge of leasing and 
environmental science.76 
 
 71.  NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 250. 
 72.  Id. at 251. 
 73.  Id. at vii. 
 74.  See, e.g., id. at 261 (“The Council on Environmental Quality and the 
Department of the Interior should revise and strengthen the NEPA policies, 
practices, and procedures to improve the level of environmental analysis, 
transparency, and consistency at all stages of the OCS planning, leasing, 
exploration, and development process.”); COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 
supra note 63, at 23-29. 
 75.  See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 63, at 4. 
 76.  NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 262. 
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Similar calls for fundamental reform were again heard, with 
renewed vigor, in the wake of the grounding of Shell’s Kulluk drilling 
unit and the numerous other problems encountered by Shell during its 
2012 Arctic drilling attempts.77 Shell’s failed efforts to complete 
exploration wells in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas triggered reviews 
and evaluations that reinforced the broad need for reform.78 In the Coast 
Guard report on the grounding of the Kulluk, the Assistant 
Commandant states that “the inadequate assessment and management 
of risks by the parties involved was the most significant causal factor in 
the mishap” and expresses dismay at the “significant number and 
nature of the potential violations of law and regulations.”79 Similarly, 
DOI’s review of Shell’s 2012 drilling season identified the need for 
Arctic-specific safety and response regulations.80 The need to reform 
NEPA processes in the Arctic region was identified even prior to 2012.81 
In sum, many of the problems that have come to light in the past 
decade, and the resulting calls for reform, involve systemic failures in 
DOI’s culture, decision-making, planning, and evaluation of potential 
in-the-water impacts. As many of the analyses show, regulatory changes 
should be informed by a holistic view of the way government makes 
decisions about whether and under what conditions to allow oil and gas 
leasing, exploration, and development. It is not sufficient simply to 
examine safety, oversight, and revenue. Though those issues are 
important, true reform requires reexamining all aspects of the relevant 
decisions. In this reexamination, the planning and leasing stages are 
significant, because they occur before rights are transferred to energy 
companies. Once an OCS lease has been sold, it becomes much more 
difficult and costly for the government to prevent or significantly curtail 
exploration activities. While OCSLA does allow the government to 
 
 77.  See Dan Joling, Shell Kulluk Ship Investigation Called For By House 
Democrats, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2013/01/03/shell-kulluk-ship-investigation_n_2404904.html. 
 78.  See Ed Crooks, US Reviews Shell’s Arctic Drilling Plans, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
(Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/356b14ee-5a0a-11e2-88a1-
00144feab49a.html#axzz3Eu2hk97B. 
 79.  U.S. COAST GUARD, supra note 62, at 1. 
 80.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 62. 
 81.  See Letter from Carole A. Holley, Alaska Program Co-Director, Pacific 
Environment, to Horst Greczmiel, Associate Director for NEPA Oversight, re: 
Review of MMS NEPA Policies, Practices, and Procedures for OCS Oil and Gas 
Exploration and Development (June 17, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
files/ceq/pe_ceq_nepa_comments_06_17_10_final.pdf; see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 66, at 21 (finding that the process for meeting 
NEPA requirements was “ill defined,” and that agency staff lacked “adequate 
guidance on how . . . to implement NEPA with respect to” programs areas). 
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cancel leases and prohibit exploration and development,82 this option is 
rarely exercised.83 Reform, therefore, should encompass the entirety of 
the OCSLA process; it should not be limited to standards that apply only 
after areas have been included in leasing programs and leases have been 
sold to energy companies. 
C. Existing Regulations Do Not Provide Guidance with Respect to 
New Priorities and Policies 
In addition to accounting for changes in the industry and calls for 
reform generated by the Deepwater Horizon tragedy and Shell’s error-
plagued Arctic drilling efforts, existing regulations should be updated to 
ensure that planning and leasing activities adhere to administrative 
priorities and policies that have been established in recent years. These 
policies include efforts to ensure transparency and open government, 
provide for greater stewardship of ocean and coastal resources, and 
promote integrated management in the U.S. Arctic. 
At the broadest level, transparency is essential to ensure the 
accountability of, and good performance by, industrial operators and 
contractors as well as regulatory agencies. President Obama made a 
commitment to create “an unprecedented level of openness in 
Government,” and “a system of transparency, public participation, and 
collaboration.”84 Similarly, the Office of Management and Budget 
directed executive agencies to, among other things, publish information 
online, improve the quality of government information, and foster a 
culture of open government.85 DOI’s planning and leasing regulations 
fail to implement these directives or move toward their underlying goals 
in any meaningful way; they do little to ensure the availability of public 
data, studies, or other information relevant to decisions about oil and 
gas planning and leasing on the OCS. 
 
 82.  43 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012). 
 83.  Though not expressly invoking this authority, BSEE limited the depth to 
which Shell was permitted to drill in 2012 in light of the company’s failure to 
comply with the terms of the conditional approval granted for its exploration 
proposal. BSEE Authorizes Shell Preparatory Activities in Beaufort Sea: Limited 
Activities to be Conducted in Non-Oil-Bearing Zones, BSEE (Sept. 20, 2012), 
http://www.bsee.gov/BSEE-Newsroom/Press-Releases/2012/BSEE-
Authorizes-Shell-Preparatory-Activities-in-Beaufort-Sea/. The company had not 
received requisite certification for part of its response plan. Id. 
 84.  Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 29, 2009). 
 85.  Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, THE 
WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY (Jan. 9, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Memorandum-for-the-Heads-
of-Executive-Departments-and-Agencies-3-9-09. 
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Existing regulations also predate President Obama’s 2010 Executive 
Order establishing a “National Policy for the Stewardship of the Ocean, 
Our Coasts, and the Great Lakes.”86 The President declared that it is 
United States policy to “protect, maintain, and restore the health and 
biological diversity of ocean, coastal, and Great Lakes ecosystems and 
resources,” to improve resiliency of ocean ecosystems, and to “use the 
best available science and knowledge to inform” decisions about the 
ocean.87 The Executive Order requires executive branch agencies to take 
the necessary actions to implement the National Ocean Policy and its 
associated stewardship principles “to the fullest extent consistent with 
applicable law.”88 Existing regulations, however, provide no standards 
to ensure that DOI’s planning and leasing activities comply. 
With respect to the Arctic in particular, existing planning and 
leasing regulations offer no standards to help regulators seeking to 
comply with the National Strategy for the Arctic Region,89 which calls 
for the pursuit of responsible stewardship, protection of the Arctic 
environment, and conservation of the region’s resources.90 Similarly, the 
Administration’s new “Integrated Arctic Management” approach is 
intended to incorporate environmental, economic, and cultural needs 
into more holistic management for the Arctic region.91 Existing 
regulations, however, do not offer guidance to help agency officials, 
industry, and the public understand how DOI’s planning and leasing 
processes will accommodate the new approach.92 
 
 86.  Exec. Order No. 13,547, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,023 (July 19, 2010). 
 87.  Id. at § 2(a). 
 88.  Id. at § 6. 
 89.  See generally WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE ARCTIC REGION 
(2013) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/ 
nat_arctic_strategy.pdf. 
 90.  Id. at 2. 
 91.  Id. at 8. 
 92.  See id. (calling for the establishment and institutionalization of a 
framework for integrated Arctic management); see also INTERAGENCY WORKING 
GROUP ON COORDINATION OF DOMESTIC ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND PERMITTING IN 
ALASKA, MANAGING FOR THE FUTURE IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING ARCTIC: A REPORT TO 
THE PRESIDENT 46 (2013) (defining “Integrated Arctic Management” as “a science-
based, whole-of-government approach to stewardship and planning in the U.S. 
Arctic that integrates and balances environmental, economic, and cultural needs 
and objectives. It is an adaptive, stakeholder-informed means for looking 
holistically at impacts and sensitivities across the U.S. Arctic and generating 
sustainable solutions.”). 
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III. CONGRESS HAS NOT ACTED TO REVISE OCSLA, AND NON-
LEGISLATIVE REFORMS HAVE YET TO ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES IN 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF OCS PLANNING AND LEASING 
As established in the preceding Parts, the rules governing OCS 
planning and leasing are more than three decades old, do not provide 
meaningful substantive guidance, have not kept pace with changes in 
the industry, and do not account for new administrative policies and 
priorities. Many of these failings have received additional emphasis in 
the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster and Shell’s 2012 failures. 
Congress, however, has taken no meaningful action to address the 
problems, and regulatory change at DOI, while significant, has not 
addressed planning or leasing. 
A. Lack of Congressional Action 
In the past, Congress has taken meaningful action to address the 
deficiencies in the statutory regime made apparent by major oil spills. 
After the Exxon Valdez disaster, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990 (OPA), which, among other things, mandated double-hulled 
tankers and facility-specific spill response plans for offshore drilling 
rigs.93 Earlier, the 1969 Santa Barbara blowout was one of the key factors 
that led Congress to pass the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) and drove Congress and the California state legislature to pass 
other substantive legislation.94 
The Deepwater Horizon disaster led to calls for Congress to reform 
OCSLA and other statutes affecting offshore oil and gas activities and 
spill response. The National Commission, for example, recommended 
that “Congress should review and consider amending where necessary 
the governing statutes for all agencies involved in offshore activities to 
be consistent with the responsibilities functionally assigned to those 
agencies.”95 More specific recommendations were made to remove or 
raise OPA’s $75 million limit on a responsible party’s liability for 
damages, improve the manner in which funds may be disbursed from 
the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, extend the 30-day deadline for 
 
 93.  Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2719 (2012)). 
 94.  See, e.g., 45 Years after the Santa Barbara Oil Spill, Looking at a Historic 
Disaster Through Technology, NOAA OFFICE OF RESPONSE AND RESTORATION, (Jan. 
28, 2014), http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/about/media/45-years-after-
santa-barbara-oil-spill-looking-historic-disaster-through-technology.html. 
 95.  NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 256. 
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reviewing exploration plans, codify the division of DOI’s planning, 
revenue, and enforcement functions, and better fund needed science.96 
Some of the recommended changes—extending the deadline for review 
of exploration plans, for example—would specifically amend provisions 
of OCSLA or another statute to improve the decision-making or liability 
scheme. Others—codifying the division of revenue, planning, and 
enforcement, for example—would create new requirements to help 
insulate decisions from political pressure and likely improve the 
scientific basis for decisions.97 
Despite these calls for reform, Congress took no action to amend 
OCSLA or otherwise alter the standards, requirements, or decision-
making framework applicable to offshore oil and gas activities. 
Congress considered a series of proposals that would have implemented 
substantive changes, but it passed only one law, the RESTORE Act, 
which addresses restoration in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon spill 
and the allocation of administrative and civil penalties.98 More recently, 
congressional action has focused on efforts designed to increase offshore 
leasing and production, although no legislation has been enacted.99 
 
 96.  See id. at 262, 264, 283–86; see also Graham & Reilly Testimony, supra note 
49, at 4–5 (identifying need to codify division of DOI functions, raise the liability 
limit, and raise the per incident payout amount from the Oil Spill Liability Trust 
Fund); Unger, supra note 60 (proposing a four-step reform process to the OPA 
and related laws). 
 97.  See, e.g., Graham and Reilly Testimony supra note 49, at 9 (stating that 
“[o]ther Commission recommendations will require congressional action, 
especially those recommendations that seek to promote the independence of the 
Offshore Safety Authority from politics”); Hartsig, supra note 16, at 311–14 
(articulating the National Commission’s recommendations for an interagency 
approach to facilitate expert scientific review system-wide). 
 98.  The RESTORE Act establishes a Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration 
Council, allocates 80% of “all administrative and civil penalties related to the 
Deepwater Horizon spill to a Gulf Coast Restoration Trust Fund, and outlines a 
structure by which the funds can be utilized to restore and protect the natural 
resources, ecosystems, fisheries, marine and wildlife habitats, beaches, coastal 
wetlands, and economy of the Gulf Coast region.” RESTORE Act, GULF COAST 
ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION COUNCIL, http://www.restorethegulf.gov/council/ 
about-gulf-coast-ecosystem-restoration-council (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
 99.  See Offshore Energy and Jobs Act, H.R. 2231, 113th Cong. (2013) (this 
bill, which passed the House of Representatives, would, among other actions, 
expand offshore leasing, remove important environmental safeguards, and 
prioritize oil and gas activities above other uses of ocean resources); see, e.g., 
Michael LeVine, Written Testimony for Legislative Hearing on HR 2231, the 
“Offshore Energy and Jobs Act,” H.R. Comm. on Natural Resources, Subcommittee 
on Energy and Mineral Resources (June 11, 2013). 
ARCTICLE - LEVINE ET AL. (DO NOT DELETE) 12/29/2014 6:10 PM 
2014 WHAT ABOUT BOEM? 251 
B. Some Progress Has Been Made to Improve Safety, Prevention, 
and Response 
Though Congress has not taken meaningful action other than 
passing the RESTORE Act, DOI and industry have made some strides to 
improve safety, prevention, and independent decision-making. While 
important, none of these changes affect the manner in which the agency 
evaluates planning or leasing decisions. 
DOI began its reform effort by dividing the agency that had been 
charged with overseeing oil and gas activities on the OCS—the Minerals 
Management Service (MMS)—into the Bureau of Ocean Energy 
Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE) and the Office of 
Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR).100 The former was tasked with 
handling regulatory functions, while the latter took on the accounting 
functions of the former MMS.101 Later, BOEMRE was further divided 
into the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), which handles 
planning and approvals, and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement (BSEE), which is charged with enforcement and 
oversight.102 This division is at least partially responsive to the need 
identified by the National Commission and others to separate revenue 
collection, safety, and planning.103 
Building on this division, ONRR promulgated a series of new 
regulations designed to improve its revenue collection functions.104 
Additionally, DOI has: 
initiated additional inspections of all deepwater oil and gas 
drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico and issued a safety 
notice to all rig operators; drafted and implemented the 30-Day 
Safety Report, including the issuance of Notices to Lessees on 
 
 100.  See, e.g., HOGUE, supra note 5, at 3, 10–11. 
 101. Id. 
 102.  Id. at 3–4. Ken Salazar, Secretarial Order 3299: “Establishment of the 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement, and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue,” DEPARTMENT OF 
INTERIOR (May 19, 2010), http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/ 
loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&PageID=32475. 
 103. See supra Part II.B; see also Press Release, U.S. Department of the Interior, 
Salazar Divides MMS’s Three Conflicting Missions: Establishes Independent 
Agency to Police Offshore Energy Operations (May 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/salazar-divides-mmss-three-
conflicting-missions.cfm (quoting Secretary of the Interior Salazar as stating that 
the purpose of the reorganization was to divide the “three distinct and 
conflicting missions” of the Minerals Management Service—”effective 
enforcement, energy development, and revenue collection”). 
 104. Rules and Regulations, OFFICE OF NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE, 
http://www.onrr.gov/Laws_R_D/default.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2014). 
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new safety and environmental requirements, and the initiation 
of new rulemakings for safety and environmental protection; 
established a moratorium on operations utilizing certain 
equipment associated with deepwater drilling; and 
implemented new requirements that operators must submit 
information regarding blowout scenarios with their 
Exploration Plans.105 
Beyond these changes, BSEE finalized an Offshore Drilling Safety rule in 
August 2012.106 “The final rule included some additional requirements 
about barriers that must be in place within the wells and extended some 
of the requirements pertaining to blowout preventers . . . .”107 BSEE has 
also issued a draft Safety Culture Policy Statement and proposed 
revisions to its Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) 
Rule.108 
DOI has committed to implementing Arctic-specific safety and spill 
prevention regulations.109 It has done so at least in part in response to 
the deficiencies made evident by Shell’s problematic 2012 efforts to drill 
exploration wells.110 These regulations are likely to codify prevention 
and response measures employed in the 2012 season but not address 
government planning or leasing obligations. In addition, DOI has stated 
its intent to use a “targeted approach” to leasing in the Arctic, which 
recognizes that some areas of the Arctic may not be suitable for leasing, 
or may require specific mitigation measures.111 However, DOI has yet to 
 
 105.  COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 63, at 2 n.3. 
 106. Press Release, BSEE, BSEE Releases Offshore Drilling Safety Rule, (Aug. 
15, 2012), available at http://www.bsee.gov/BSEE-Newsroom/Press-
Releases/2012/BSEE-Releases-Offshore-Drilling-Safety-Rule/. 
 107.  OIL SPILL COMMISSION ACTION, ASSESSING PROGRESS THREE YEARS LATER 7 
(2013), available at http://oscaction.org/wp-content/uploads/FINAL_OSCA-
No2-booklet-Apr-2013_web.pdf. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  See Tim Bradner, Interior Dept. May Have Draft Rules for Arctic by Year-
end, ALASKA J. OF COMMERCE (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.alaskajournal.com/ 
Alaska-Journal-of-Commerce/June-Issue-3-2013/Interior-Dept-may-have-draft-
rules-for-Arctic-by-year-end. 
 110.  See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE 
INTERIOR, REVIEW OF SHELL’S 2012 ALASKA OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION 
PROGRAM 6 (2013), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/ 
upload/Shell-report-3-8-13-Final.pdf (“Government and industry should 
continue to evaluate the potential development of additional Arctic-specific 
standards in the areas of drilling and maritime safety and emergency response 
equipment and systems.”). 
 111.  U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGM’T, PROPOSED 
FINAL OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM 2012-2017 206 
(2012), available at http://www.boem.gov/uploadedFiles/BOEM/ 
Oil_and_Gas_Energy_Program/Leasing/Five_Year_Program/2012-
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implement this change in a planning process or lease sale, and there has 
been no proposal to formalize it in regulation.  
Industry, too, has made progress.112 According to the former 
commissioners from the National Commission on the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, companies and spill response 
organizations have “significantly expanded the quality and quantity of 
the equipment to respond to a spill.”113 
C. Despite Some Progress on Other Fronts, the Regulations 
Governing Planning and Leasing Have Not Improved 
The reforms and policy changes enumerated above, though 
potentially valuable in increasing safety, accident prevention, and spill 
response, apply only after DOI has decided to allow oil and gas 
activities to proceed in particular areas. None of the codified 
improvements have addressed the identified deficiencies in the 
administration of planning and leasing on the OCS. For example, the 
former members of the National Commission “remain concerned that 
[BOEM] has as yet to propose any regulations strengthening practices 
and procedures for preparing [environmental impact] statements and 
improving the quality of the reviews during the planning, leasing, 
exploration, and development stages.”114 
The planning and leasing stages are especially critical because they 
are when DOI determines whether particular areas of the ocean will be 
made available for leasing and potential exploration drilling and 
development. To the extent that DOI and other agencies wish to 
implement broad management decisions affecting the OCS—such as a 
decision not to allow drilling activities in an important marine area—
they can most easily do so at the planning and leasing stages. As noted 
above, once an energy company leases an area of the OCS, it becomes 
significantly more difficult for the government to reverse course. For all 
of these reasons, DOI should take action to reform the regulations 
governing its preparation of five-year leasing programs and sale of OCS 
leases. 
 
2017_Five_Year_Program/PFP%2012-17.pdf; see id. at 7 (noting that “certain 
subsets of Arctic areas will be excluded because environmental and subsistence 
conditions strongly weigh in favor of keeping them off the table for exploration 
and development”). 
 112.  See generally OIL SPILL COMMISSION ACTION, supra note 107. 
 113. Id. at 3. The former commissioners also express hope, though tempered, 
for the industry-sponsored Center for Offshore Safety. Id. at 7. 
 114.  Id. at 8. 
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IV. DOI CAN TAKE ACTION THAT WOULD MEANINGFULLY 
ADDRESS SHORTCOMINGS IN EXISTING PLANNING AND LEASING 
REGULATIONS 
As the preceding Part makes clear, both DOI and industry have 
improved some of the structures, regulations, and policies that govern 
offshore oil and gas activities. The reforms undertaken to date have been 
necessary and important, but they have not been comprehensive, and 
significant shortcomings remain. To address these shortcomings, DOI 
could carry out a broader reform process—one designed to advance the 
foundational changes that started when Secretary Salazar disbanded the 
Minerals Management Service and created BOEM, BSEE, and ONRR. 
While many aspects of DOI’s OCS regulations should be revisited,115 
substantive changes to the regulations that govern the planning and 
leasing stages are particularly critical.  
As explained in the Parts below, OCSLA gives DOI discretion to 
promulgate revised planning and leasing regulations. Revised 
regulations could provide more clarity and guidance, which, in turn, 
would help to ensure more effective balancing of energy development 
and environmental protection. This type of regulatory reform could 
remedy many of the deficiencies identified in the foregoing Parts. 
A. DOI Has the Authority to Pursue Regulatory Reform 
OCSLA not only calls for the “expeditious and orderly 
development” of offshore oil and gas resources, it also requires that 
development to be “subject to environmental safeguards.”116 As 
described above, Congress enacted the 1978 Amendments to OCSLA in 
part to help ensure that efforts to develop oil and gas resources were 
balanced with environmental protections.117 OCSLA’s provisions allow 
DOI significant flexibility to determine how to achieve this balance, but 
current regulations provide relatively little guidance. Given the 
flexibility inherent in OCSLA, DOI is free to promulgate revised 
regulations that provide more direction to regulators, the industry, and 
the general public. In fact, with regard to leasing, OCSLA explicitly 
provides that the Secretary of the Interior “may at any time prescribe 
and amend . . . rules and regulations as he determines to be necessary 
 
 115.  For example, DOI has not yet reformed regulations that govern its 
review of exploration plans for OCS oil and gas activities. NAT’L COMM’N ON THE 
BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 80. 
 116.  43 U.S.C. § 1332(3) (2012). 
 117.  See supra Part I.A. 
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and proper in order to provide for the prevention of waste and 
conservation of the natural resources of the outer Continental Shelf, and 
the protection of correlative rights therein . . . .”118 
OCSLA’s mandate to develop a five-year OCS leasing program 
offers a good example of the discretion afforded to DOI. Section 18 of 
OCSLA requires the Secretary of the Interior to prepare a five-year OCS 
leasing program that achieves “a proper balance between the potential 
for environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of oil and gas, 
and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone.”119 The statute 
requires the Secretary to consider certain factors when making this 
determination,120 but it is for the Secretary to decide what actually 
constitutes a “proper balance” and determine how to measure the 
various factors considered.121 Ultimately, OCSLA “gives the Secretary of 
the Interior tremendous discretion.”122 
Existing regulations provide no guidance to help the Secretary 
strike the balance mandated by OCSLA. Regulations implementing this 
section of OCSLA simply do not address this aspect of the statute. As a 
result of this regulatory deficiency, “[t]he Secretary can assign 
significant weight to environmental protection concerns—or not.”123  
DOI has the ability to clarify the five-year program balancing 
requirements imposed by OCSLA through promulgation of revised 
agency regulations, so long as the new regulations are consistent with 
the underlying statute.124 Given the broad statutory mandates described 
above, DOI has significant latitude to develop more detailed regulations 
that include standards defining the various factors and explaining how 
the Secretary will consider and weigh them. Such regulations would 
create an understandable and repeatable process to help ensure that 
future five-year programs achieve the “proper balance” mandated by 
OCSLA’s five-year planning provisions.  
 
 118.  § 1334(a). 
 119.  Id. § 1344(a)(3). 
 120.  Id. § 1344(a)(2). 
 121.  For example, OCSLA Section 18(a)(2)(G) requires consideration of “the 
relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of different areas of 
the outer Continental Shelf.” 
 122.  NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 80. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Cf. Chevron v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984) (holding that if Congress has not directly addressed a particular question, 
courts must defer to the agency’s permissible construction of the statute). 
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B. Improvements to OCS Planning and Leasing Regulations Could 
Remedy the Shortcomings Identified in the Foregoing Sections 
Carried out effectively, reform of DOI’s OCS planning and leasing 
regulations could result in guidance that leads to better processes and 
outcomes. Revised regulations could help ensure that DOI applies the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) consistently and receives the 
full benefit of the process; is armed with knowledge sufficient to make 
informed decisions; conforms to new policies that promote ocean 
stewardship; and fulfills the Administration’s commitment to 
transparency and open government. This type of regulatory reform 
could also benefit energy companies seeking to operate on the OCS by 
fostering more regulatory consistency and certainty. 
Revised regulations could clarify and strengthen DOI’s application 
of NEPA requirements to the OCSLA planning and leasing process. For 
example, revised regulations could codify processes for NEPA 
consultation and coordination among DOI agencies—such as BOEM, 
BSEE, and the Fish and Wildlife Service—and with other federal 
agencies including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and others. Similarly, regulations 
could specify a protocol that facilitates effective consultation with 
affected tribes and Native corporations. Clarifying the relationship 
between OCSLA and NEPA at the planning and lease-sale stages could 
also reduce confusion related to “tiering” between different levels of 
environmental analysis,125 which could help eliminate analytical gaps 
and ensure that environmental analyses more accurately capture the 
cumulative effects of existing and anticipated development. By spelling 
out exactly how the agency will comply with NEPA’s requirements at 
each stage of the OCSLA process, DOI can reduce confusion, promote 
consistency, and facilitate more meaningful involvement. 
Adoption of revised OCS planning and leasing regulations could 
also help ensure that DOI has access to the information necessary to 
make wise decisions about whether, where, and how to make areas of 
the OCS available for oil and gas development. For example, revised 
regulations could require a certain level or quality of scientific 
information about an area of the OCS before that area is included in a 
five-year program or lease sale. Similarly, revised regulations could 
require DOI to take certain steps to solicit and consider traditional 
knowledge about marine areas under consideration for leasing. These 
 
 125.  Cf. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 63 at 22–26; NAT’L 
COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 43, at 260. 
ARCTICLE - LEVINE ET AL. (DO NOT DELETE) 12/29/2014 6:10 PM 
2014 WHAT ABOUT BOEM? 257 
steps would help ensure that government agencies have access to, and 
take into account, information from local residents, including Alaska 
Natives. Revised regulations could also ensure that regulators 
understand the potential limitations of oil spill response in a given area, 
which could help DOI effectively describe and weigh the potential risks 
of activities in areas where there are significant hurdles to effective spill 
response. 
Regulatory reform can also provide direction to facilitate 
compliance with the stewardship responsibilities established in the 
National Ocean Policy.126 Regulations could establish standards that 
help DOI ensure that its planning and leasing activities “protect, 
maintain, and restore the health and biological diversity” of ocean and 
coastal areas and improve resiliency of ocean ecosystems “to the fullest 
extent consistent with applicable law.”127 With respect to the Arctic in 
particular, revised regulations could help define how DOI comports 
with the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, including its calls to 
“pursue responsible Arctic region stewardship,” and “protect the Arctic 
environment and conserve its resources.”128 For example, regulations 
could require DOI to use available information to identify marine areas 
that are most critical to ecosystem functioning, including regions 
identified as subsistence use areas. Revised regulations could also codify 
DOI’s “targeted approach” to leasing in the Arctic, which recognizes 
that some areas of the Arctic may not be suitable for leasing or may 
require specific mitigation measures.129 
OCS planning and leasing regulations could also be revised to 
promote more transparent and inclusive processes, consistent with 
President Obama’s open government directive.130 DOI could change 
existing regulations to ensure that data, studies, and other information 
relevant to OCS planning and leasing processes are made available to 
the public and posted online for easy access. Ensuring the availability of 
information about the OCS may also help foster increased or more 
meaningful public participation in OCS planning and leasing processes. 
In addition, regulatory reform could have the salutary benefit of 
providing certainty to companies. As one example, albeit from the 
exploration phase, both ConocoPhillips and Statoil identified uncertain 
 
 126.  Exec. Order No. 13,547, supra note 86. 
 127.  Id. at §§ 2(a), 6. 
 128.  WHITE HOUSE, supra note 89. 
 129.  See U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 110, at 7 (noting that “certain 
subsets of Arctic areas will be excluded because environmental and subsistence 
conditions strongly weigh in favor of keeping them off the table for exploration 
and development.”). 
 130.  See supra, Part II.C. 
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standards as reasons for delaying exploration in the Arctic Ocean. In 
fact, ConocoPhillips announced in a press statement that it was delaying 
planned exploration activities “given the uncertainties of evolving 
federal regulatory requirements and operational permitting 
standards.”131 Using regulatory reform to clarify the planning and 
leasing processes—and the exploration plan approval process—would 
provide at least a measure of the certainty that these companies seek. 
CONCLUSION AND PATH FORWARD 
The 1978 amendments to OCSLA were intended to ensure an 
appropriate balance between the pursuit of hydrocarbon resources in 
federal waters and the protection of the marine environment. All too 
often, however, DOI has fallen short of this objective. Over the years, 
there have been numerous calls for reform, especially in the wake of the 
2010 Deepwater Horizon tragedy and Shell’s error-ridden effort to drill 
exploration wells in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas in 2012.132  
DOI has taken some important steps toward better governance of 
OCS oil and gas activities. The most visible and public of these changes 
has been the transition from the Minerals Management Service (MMS) to 
the three new agencies that have taken its place: ONRR, BSEE, and 
BOEM. This change was intended to be more than a re-branding of a 
troubled agency; it was meant to be a step toward fundamental change 
in agency culture.133 While there has been some progress in that 
direction, the cultural shift largely has yet to be codified in new or 
revised agency regulations. 
The exceptions to this rule have been largely directed at safety and 
performance standards, such as promulgation of the 2013 Offshore 
Drilling Safety Rule,134 issuance of the draft Safety Culture Policy 
Statement and proposed revisions to the Safety and Environmental 
Management Systems Rule,135 and the announcement of future Arctic-
specific safety and prevention regulations.136 With regard to planning 
and leasing, however, BOEM and BSEE still rely on outdated regulations 
 
 131.  News Release, Regulatory Uncertainty Leads ConocoPhillips to Put 2014 
Chukchi Sea Exploration Drilling Plans on Hold, ConocoPhillips Alaska (April 
10, 2013), available at http://alaska.conocophillips.com/Documents/NR-AK-
Chukchi%20Sea-FINAL%204-9-2013.pdf. 
 132.  HOGUE, supra note 5, at 9. 
 133.  See generally id. 
 134. Press Release, BSEE, supra note 106. 
 135. Revisions to Safety and Environmental Management Systems, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 56,683 (Sep. 14, 2011) (to be codified as 30 C.F.R. pt 250). 
 136.  Bradner, supra 109. 
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that have not kept pace with changes the industry and do not reflect 
new priorities and policies. Similar problems exist with respect to the 
regulations that address the approval of exploration and oil spill 
response plans, and it is clear that comprehensive reform is needed. 
 DOI is already contemplating Arctic-specific regulations aimed at 
improving drilling safety and spill response in that region. The agency 
should complete this process. Once the new Arctic-specific rules are 
complete, DOI could announce an Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking and begin a suite of regulatory reforms that cover other 
aspects of the OCSLA process, including the five-year planning, lease 
sale, and exploration plan approval stages. This sort of comprehensive 
overhaul would not be simple, and DOI might consider a step-wise 
process that aims to reform one portion of the regulations at a time. This 
process would take time—each portion of the regulations could easily 
take a year or more to complete137—but that is all the more reason to 
start now. 
Announcing this type of comprehensive regulatory reform would 
send a strong signal that DOI intends to keep moving forward with the 
transition from the old MMS and toward a new way of doing business 
on the OCS. 
  
 
 137.  See, e.g., WILMA A. LEWIS, MARY L. KENDALL & RHEA S. SUH, U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE INTERIOR OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SAFETY OVERSIGHT BOARD REPORT TO 
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR KEN SALAZAR 26 (2010), available at 
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/upload/OCS-Safety-Oversight-
Board-Report.pdf (recognizing that “[r]egulations typically take years to 
promulgate”). 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A. 30 C.F.R. pt. 556 Amendment History Summary 
Date Federal Register Summary 
1979-06-29 44 FR 38,268 
Implements OCSLA 1978 changes; 
redesignates 43 CFR Subpart 2883 
(rights-of-way management) into 
Part 3300
1982-10-22 47 FR 47,006 
Redesignates 43 CFR Part 3300 
(admin. by BLM) to 30 CFR Part 256 
(MMS)
1983-09-23 48 FR 43,323 Adds a new Information Collection section to 30 CFR Part 256
1988-01-28 53 FR 10,596 
Restructures and consolidates 
existing rules; formalizes OCS 
Orders developed to govern 
operations conducted in each of 
MMS’s four OCS Regions and 
portions of selected Notices to 
Lessees and Operators issued by 
regional offices
1989-12-08 54 FR 50,615 Technical corrections
1993-08-27 58 FR 45,255 Amends surety bond provisions 
1994-10-21 59 FR 53,091 
Specifically states the authority of 
MMS to require lessees or operators 
to conduct archaeological resource 
surveys and submit reports prior to 
exploration, development and 
production, or installation of lease 
term or right-of-way pipelines; 
standardizes the definition and use 
of the term “archaeological 
resources”
1996-07-03 61 FR 34,730 Allows agency extension of bid acceptance period
1996-10-30 61 FR 55,887 Amends lease terms based on depth 
1997-05-22 62 FR 27,948 
Amends surety bond provisions; 
makes other changes that reduce the 
risk of default by an underfunded 
operator
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Date Federal Register Summary
1997-07-10 62 FR 36,995 Correction to 62 FR 27948
1999-02-24 64 FR 9065 Technical corrections
1999-03-18 64 FR 13,343 Correction to 64 FR 9065
1999-12-28 64 FR 72,756 
Updates and clarifies requirements 
related to post-lease operations; 
allows the grant of rights-of-use and 
easements for an OCS blocks to 
state lessees; brings uniformity to 
the public release time for all 
proprietary geophysical data and 
information gathered under 
prelease; clarifies the distinction 
between granting and directing a 
suspension; requires evacuation 
statistics for natural occurrences; 
sets out criteria to disqualify an 
operator with repeated poor 
operating performance; allows 
operators the opportunity to 
propose alternative regulatory 
approaches
2000-01-19 65 FR 2874 Technical corrections
2001-02-23 66 FR 11,512 
Establishes a new leasing incentive 
framework; adds minor reporting 
requirement for all leases issued 
with royalty suspension and 
specifies the allocation of royalty 
relief on a field having lease issued 
before and after 2000
2001-06-19 66 FR 32,902 Eliminates separate offshore definition of “affected state”
2001-12-03 66 FR 60,147 
Modifies surety provisions; codifies 
terms and conditions under which a 
surety will be relieved of 
responsibility when MMS 
terminates the period of liability of 
a bond
2002-05-17 67 FR 35,398 Updates decommissioning requirements
2005-08-25 70 FR 49,871 Implements new fees to offset internal costs 
2005-09-26 70 FR 56,119 Hurricane Katrina related extensions
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Date Federal Register Summary
2005-10-27 70 FR 61,891 Hurricane Katrina related extensions
2008-08-25 73 FR 49,943 Electronic payments
2008-09-12 73 FR 52,917 Creates bonus royalty credits for relinquishing certain leases
2009-09-14 74 FR 46,904 Technical corrections
2011-10-18 76 FR 64,432 Redesignates 30 CFR Part 256 (MMS) to 30 CFR Part 556 (BOEM) 
